ONLINE DISCUSSION
[session 1 start: 31/10/2007 15:18  end : 31/10/2007 16:52]

Instructor
Mizruchi Mark

Participants
Breuer Marcos Guillermo
Maguada Paolo
Roda Renato
Chowdhury Arnab Roy
Strutz Julia

Moderator
Torrisi Giovanni

Guest
Kazepov Yuri

To mantain the "live" and international feel of our first "Meet the author" session, the trascription has not been edited except for typos and repetitions.

[Kazepov Yuri] First of all I would like to thank prof.Mizruchi, for being here with us today, it has not been easy with the transition to the Wintertime change ... I think we can start with the questions and/or comments to Prof. Mizruchi's paper.  Giovanni Torrisi will moderate the chat, so please go ahead.

[Mizruchi Mark] Good afternoon (morning here) to all of you. And thanks for having me here. I'm ready whenever you are.

 

[Torrisi Giovanni] Good day to everybody. Let's begin our session today with prof. Mizruchi. What will be discussed today is related to the paper by prof. Mizruchi about "Political Economy and Network Analysis: an Untapped convergence".

[Question from Breuer Marcos Guillermo] Thank you, prof. Mizruchi, for your paper. Can we say as a resume, that political economy concentrates mainly with theory, but it is poor with empirical research - and the contrary to system analysis?

[Mizruchi Mark] I think it's fair to say that political economy, as I've described it in the paper, does concentrate heavily on theory. I don't think it's fair to say that it's "poor" with empirical research. Sometimes the empirical claims are very broad, and therefore abstract. Regarding your point about it being contrary to system analysis, could you elaborate on that?

[Breuer Marcos Guillermo] Yes, I mean, network analysis seems to be rich with empirical research, but quite "naive" with big theorization... would you say that also?

[Question from Mizruchi Mark] I agree that network analysts have not always paid sufficient attention to larger theoretical issues.  I would not call them "naive" on the issue, though. Actually some of them probably do underemphasize theoretical issues, but others are very attuned to theory.

[Torrisi Giovanni] Let's give now the floor to Renato Roda.

[Question from Roda Renato] Thanks to you all for the opportunity. I have what I think is just a simple methodological question: the study of only simple dyads - as you have used in your research - is enough as a proxy of unity between the firms under focus?

[Mizruchi Mark] No, the study of dyads is not adequate to capture system-level unity.

[Torrisi Giovanni] Renato, would you like to add something?

[Roda Renato] Yes, that’s my doubt...

[Mizruchi Mark] I used dyads as a way to get at the question of the relation between inter-firm links and political unity. But it was a pragmatic solution that did not get at the problem of system-level properties.

[Torrisi Giovanni] Very well. Now let us give some time to read the very long question by Federico Savini.

[Question from Savini Federico] 'I'm Federico savini, nice to meet you prof. Mizruchi... My first question is related to the difference between political economy and network analysis. In particular I was wondering if some common point could be found, within their main theoretical assumption. It seems to me that the main difference between the two approaches is the focus of analysis. Political economy emphasizes the role of "objective" institutions - at least according to the text they are claimed to be objective, while the network analysis focuses on "the specific situations in which actors find themselves." In sum: Focusing on the situation rather than on the "objective" nature of the norm. However, according to institutional analysis, the individual agency is still important. This appears to be a common point; network analysis emphasizes the position of nodes within the structure and, in turn, the political economy leaves room for individual agency (influenced by individual preferences and, let’s, say positioning, for example in the power network).
Maybe I misunderstood, but institutional analysis doesn’t seem to overlook the role of agency in changing institutions. The structures are objective but subjected to change (differently with the idea that "class relations have an objective character and that individual actors are the bearers of these objective relations" cited in your text. The question is: how can we discuss the role of agency both in institutional analysis and in network analysis...are they a first linking point for their integration?

[Mizruchi Mark] Hi Federico. Your question is very challenging.  I was trying to find common ground between political economy and network analysis by using power structure research as an example.  This approach deals with large issues of class and the state, but also examines concrete networks.  Agency is a problem for both approaches.  The difficulty is that it's easy to posit that agency exists and is important.  It's much more difficult to build it into a theoretical model. 

[Question from Savini Federico] A second question about one of the theoretical assumptions of network analysis. In the text you state that relationship among actors can be "mapped into a structure... and the structure of the resulting network determines to a great extent the nature of the relations within it." I'm wondering how this conceptual shift from the structure to the nature can be justified and, let's say, empirically possible. I mean...the role of individual hidden motivations (think about hidden agendas in policy making) are key points for understanding the nature of networks. Can you explain please?

[Mizruchi Mark] Yes, the role of motives is a significant problem.  What network theorists have traditionally done is try to decouple motives from outcomes, because even if we know peoples' motives, they don't necessarily predict behavior.  For example, most Americans say they would prefer a Canadian-style health-care system, but this has not happened, because the U.S. public is not politically organized and they face strong opposition from powerful corporations.  So knowing the constraints tells us much more about the outcome than knowing peoples’ subjective views.

[Torrisi Giovanni] Very challenging and very long questions by Federico. Maybe you can summarise it somehow for the future? Let's also give the floor to Chowdhury and Maguada that have still not spoken today. Post the questions in the usual way.

[Question from Breuer Marcos Guillermo] I have a question in an other direction. That is: How exactly rules the "ruling class"? I mean, what is exactly the relation / influence of the corporate elite to the government? Lobbying? Participating in commissions? What else?

[Mizruchi Mark] Well, Fred Block argued that "the ruling class does not rule."  He, as well as Charles Lindblom, argued that the state *has* to serve business because it depends on their investment for its revenue.  But corporations spend enormous effort trying to influence the state.  They lobby extensively, they fund election campaigns, and they threaten to move off-shore or not invest if they disagree with proposed policies.

[Question from Chowdhury Arnab Roy] Sir, the division between agency and structure as Savini has shown is for analytical purposes I understand, but there can be no such distinction I think, since the process of structuration is important, as Giddens says, and at the same time do you think that network analysis can be successfull when time will be taken as another dimension in formation of a structure?

[Mizruchi Mark] I agree with you (and Giddens) on theoretical grounds.  It's not really possible to separate agency and structure.  On the other hand, if we are trying to explain something, one needs an analytical starting point.  If we fail to do this, then our empirical analysis risks becoming entirely descriptive.

[Question from Magaudda Paolo] Hi, I'm Paolo Magaudda; I have a more general question. I would like to ask you if you recognized in the Italian Marxist tradition some interesting elements useful in developing your research field; and more in general how, in your opinion, Italian Marxism and post-Marxism is perceived in USA. Thanks.

[Mizruchi Mark] Hi Paolo. The primary Italian Marxist for most of us has been Gramsci.  He is widely admired in the U.S.  In fact, at Michigan State (a neighboring university) they are having a Gramsci conference, I think this week.  Overall, however, Marxism has pretty much died out in American social science. It survives in some post-colonial writing but has little remaining influence in American sociology.  There are many reasons for this.

[Torrisi Giovanni] And another question by Federico.

[Question from Savini Federico] While I was reading I found a lot of similarities with the regime theory by Stoker and Rhodes. I found really interesting how in the same way this approach towards urban policy analysis focuses on informal and formal relationships among heterogeneous actors (private, public, non profit, etc.). Moreover, it focuses, in the same way, on the nature of the relationships, the resources exchanged among these actors and on the nature of the actors in itself. On the other side it doesn't overlook the role of institutions in determing policy making. Democratic institutions, legal norms and social institutions (let's think about the social character of several non for profit agencies). Can be regime theory one further matching point between network analysis and political economy? What do you think Prof.?

[Mizruchi Mark] There do seem to be significant compatibilities.

[Question from Chowdhury Arnab Roy] Sir, how can we include historical time as a dimension to network analysis as it is more situational?

[Mizruchi Mark] The role of time has been a difficult problem in network analysis.  For a long time people took "snapshots," as in panel-type studies.  That's what I did in my first book, a 70-year study of interlocks in the U.S.  More recently some network people have looked at changes in networks.  The techniques are more sophisticated, but they still seem to involve snapshots.  In a recent paper (in the American Sociological Review, 2006), two colleagues and I showed that the effect of interfirm networks on firms' use of debt financing declined over time.  To explain this we invoked neo-institutional theory, however.

[Question from Roda Renato] In the paper you described how the influence of the bank and finance capital in US economy shrank after the '50s of the past century. But how is the situation now? Because here in Italy financial instituitions have never been so powerful and influential as they are now...

[Mizruchi Mark] The issue, I think, is the changing role of financial institutions.  In earlier decades in the U.S., commercial banks were powerful because of their control of loan capital, while investment banks were not very influential.  In the 1980s the power of commercial banks declined because firms found alternative sources of financing.  Meanwhile, the power of investment banks increased because of the acquisition wave.  Today, investment and commerical banks are again fused (as they were prior to the 1930s). Wall Street is very influential in the U.S. economy, but it's not banks per se, but rather institutional investors and analysts. I don't know how that relates to what's happening in Italy.

[Question from Breuer Marcos Guillermo] Another question regarding a different point. Concerning the composition of the "boards"... Can you say that the majority of the members come from upper-class families? Or is there some "social mobility", d.i. from middle class to the boards?

[Mizruchi Mark] I'm actually studying this right now.  I'm not 100 percent sure until I see the data, but my sense is that these people are less likely to come from upper-class families than they used to be.  Instead, they come from privileged, but largely professional, backgrounds; more upper-middle class.

[Breuer Marcos Guillermo] So, some relative mobility…

[Mizruchi Mark] Yes, but it's not mobility from working class or lower-middle class backgrounds; just not old-money elites. I think the U.S. elite has lost its cohesiveness at the top, and one possible reason is that it's based less in old money than it used to be.

[Question from Breuer Marcos Guillermo] Good, interesting topic!

[Question from Chowdhury Arnab Roy] Sir, you have mentioned about the famous miliband poulantzas debate, on which Laclau has written extensively and to some extent supported the theoretical framework of poulantzas where "relative autonomy of the state" has been given more importance....can you highlight a bit more on this...

[Mizruchi Mark] I always thought that on purely theoretical grounds, Poulantzas made more sense.  There is no reason that the family backgrounds of state officials have to matter.  The state also sometimes acts against the short-run interests of business, although not very often in the recent U.S.  My problem with Poulantzas is that his argument struck me as tautological:  Whatever the state does is by definition in the interests of the capitalist class.  How does one disprove this?

[Question from Breuer Marcos Guillermo] What are the practical implications of your study? I mean, you are trying to show the strong embeddedness of boards - government. Can we change that? Is there room for real democracy?

[Mizruchi Mark] When I first started, we were all involved in the Marxist debates on the state.  The others in the Stony Brook group (from which I came) wanted to show that the U.S. was not a democracy since the elite had no significant divisions.  I guess the idea was to advocate some sort of radical change in the system.  In more recent years those old goals have receded, and most of us have become liberals—which is about all one can hope for in the contemporary world.  I've also been more concerned with simply trying to understand the world, which I suppose opens me up to Marx's last point in his Theses on Feuerbach.  I'm interested in seeing what connections are there, and what the consequences are.  I also think that we would be better off if the old-style corporate liberals (described by Domhoff and Weinstein in the 1960s) made a comeback, and I'm trying to understand what has happened to them.

[Question from Roda Renato] It would be interesting to know if this relative shift in the social origin of firms boards members changed the political action of companies... From here, doesn't really look so. Neo-liberism and neo-conservatorism don’t really look so neo.

[Mizruchi Mark] I actually think that it might have had an effect.  The new corporate elite seems to have less of a sense of noblesse oblige than that of earlier decades, and I think the current neo stuff may be a result of that.

[Question from Chowdhury Arnab Roy] That’s true, but... will you concede to as many post-Marxists put forward that a theory can be proved wrong only if there is something wrong in its posing of inner problematic or there is something wrong in the structure of the theory...because otherwise no theory actually reaches the empirical ground....and hence it is a endless signifier....sigifier cahin.

[Mizruchi Mark] I will agree that simply finding contrary evidence does not prove that a theory is wrong.  After all, as Stanley Lieberson noted, just because a feather doesn't fall quickly to the ground does not disprove the law of gravity.  So yes, the logical structure of a theory is the most important thing.

[Breuer Marcos Guillermo] Are you studing the relations board government in Europe?

[Mizruchi Mark] Others have done this- Paul Windolf, for example, and Eelke Heemskerk in the Netherlands.  Everyone who has commented on my current project says that I need to look at Europe; any suggestions as to the best place(s) to look?

[Torrisi Giovanni] Anyone?

[Roda Renato] I think interconnection in Italian capitalism may be very intersting

[Breuer Marcos Guillermo] I think a comparetive study can be very appropriate! USA-Europe

[Mizruchi Mark] Yes, I agree. Many people have told me that the corporate elite is undergoing similar declines in Europe.  Heemskerk argues that this has happened in the Netherlands.  His book is called Decline of the Corporate Community.

[Chowdhury Arnab Roy] I think Antwerp (Belgium) diamond cartels (they are the corporations) and Government relations can be studied as they have immense power on Belgium government.

[Mizruchi Mark] Yes. One question, though, is the role of the EU.  In my last visit to Italy (summer 2006), I got off the plane in Milano and did not even have to pass through customs.  The national governments in Europe would appear to be weakening under these conditions.  Is that your sense?

[Roda Renato] I don't know if is weakness of central goverment. I think more of a typical Italian transport malfunction.

[Torrisi Giovanni] We have several agreements for which there is in practice free movements of goods, people (European citizenship) and services. No more customs or frontiers among EU member states are in place. If I travel from France to Germany I do not need to show even the passport according to the Schengen agreement. I can import and export any quantity of (almost) any item.

[Breuer Marcos Guillermo] Weakening of national governments, perhaps, but more strength to European Union as a political actor.

[Mizruchi Mark] Right. So movement within the EU is becoming like movement across states within the U.S.

[Breuer Marcos Guillermo] I would say so. The difficulty is to enter in the EU!

[Torrisi Giovanni] The internal borders have been almost disappearing against an increase of the "external EU" borders.

[Mizruchi Mark] I have a sense that a lot of people are studying this, though. I have to figure out whether I will have anything to add to the work that is already being done.  Otherwise I can use this work as comparative material. Any last questions?

[Torrisi Giovanni] Thanks to prof. Mizruchi for the interesting chat, it was really enlightening in many aspects and all of you for questions and comments...

[Roda Renato] Yes, thank you very much

[Mizruchi Mark] Thanks to all of you. These were very interesting, and challenging, questions. I'd be happy to do this again sometime.

[Chowdhury Arnab Roy] Thanks to Prof Mizruchi , Prof Giovanni and other participants.

[Torrisi Giovanni] I hope to see all of you again for the third appointment with "meeting with the author" in January.